Your doorbell recognises faces locally, which is great, except the app that manages whose face is whose runs on Chinese cloud servers. Like saying your diary is private because you write it at home — while your secretary in Shenzhen keeps the index. Aqara built a secret remote control into your hub that runs any command as root with no logs. When researchers found it, instead of removing it, they put a screen door on the backdoor. The hub your doorbell depends on has a skeleton key built in.
What they claim: "AI-based facial recognition is executed locally on device for faster response and privacy protection."
What we found: Face database (30 faces) tagged/named through Aqara Home app requiring Lumi United cloud account on Chinese servers. "Local" processing real, but metadata about whose face is whose flows through app to Lumi's cloud.
What they claim: "Facial recognition reduces false alerts and ensures you're always informed about who's at your door."
What we found: Doorbell stores 30 faces, triggers different automations per person, labels unknowns for review. Biometric surveillance registry of everyone approaching your home — delivery drivers, neighbours, friends. None consented to facial recognition.
What they claim: Aqara markets "local automation" that "works even when internet connection is down."
What we found: Community testing: blocking hub's internet causes all 128 connected Zigbee devices to stop responding. Hub strobe-flashes blue until internet restored. "Local" automations may survive briefly but hub is cloud-dependent.
What they claim: Aqara Home is a smart home management app.
What we found: App requests 54 permissions including fine location, camera, Bluetooth, extensive network access. SDKs collect device ID, Android ID, MAC, SSID, BSSID, installed app list, sensor data. AndroidX Webkit SDK collects this "multiple times."
What they claim: Aqara protects data with regional storage and "data desensitization."
What we found: Data centres in China, US, Singapore, Korea, Russia, Germany. Privacy policy permits transfers to any. "Desensitization" only applies to data "directly transmitted back to mainland China" — leaving indirect transmission and metadata unaddressed.
What they claim: Aqara markets HomeKit Secure Video compatibility and encrypted storage.
What we found: CVE-2025-65294 (CVSS 9.8): Hub firmware contains undocumented CoAP endpoint /lumi/gw/rpc allowing remote execution of arbitrary shell commands with root privileges. No audit trail. "Fix" was adding easily-bypassed filters rather than removing the capability.
What they claim: "Executed locally on device for faster response and privacy protection."
What we found: Lumi United headquartered in Shenzhen. China National Intelligence Law Art 7: all organisations "shall support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts." US DHS warns China can "direct firms to covertly install backdoors" — which is exactly what CVE-2025-65294 documents.
What they claim: "Keeps your data safe by encrypting it."
What we found: CVE-2025-65291: Hub fails to validate server certificates in TLS connections for discovery and CoAP communications. Enables man-in-the-middle attacks on device control and monitoring.
What they claim: Aqara: "We provide continuous security updates for IoT products."
What we found: CVE-2025-65295: Hub fails to validate firmware signatures during updates, uses outdated crypto. Combined with CVE-2025-65291 TLS failure, attacker can push malicious firmware to hub controlling doorbell, cameras, and 128 Zigbee devices.
What they claim: HomeKit Secure Video provides end-to-end encryption via iCloud.
What we found: HKSV encrypts video stream to iCloud, but Aqara Hub with CVE-2025-65294 root shell sits on same network. Hub can reach other network devices. HomeKit protects video; does nothing about compromised hub seeing your entire network.